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THE EXEMPTION OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
FROM REAL PROPERTY TAXATION IN ILLINOIS
Since state governments are constantly confronted with financial crises,
much attention focuses on sources of tax revenue. An area certain to receive
close scrutiny is the real property tax exemption for charitable institutions.
In 1954, an Ohio study by the Cuyahoga County Auditor (that county in-
cludes Cleveland) found that 17% of the entire county's real property was
tax exempt, while in Cleveland the figure was 21%. The market value of
this exempt property was estimated to be approximately two billion dollars.
Charitable institutions represented more than 40% of the dollar value, while
the remainder represented other tax exempt institutions.' With the pro-
liferation of non-profit organizations seeking real property tax exemption
as charities, it would seem most appropriate that the development of what
is a charitable use and purpose should be reviewed.
The Illinois Constitution grants the power to exempt from taxation to
the legislature.
The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corpora-
tions, both real and personal, and such other property as may be
used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for
school, religious, cemetery, and other charitable purposes, may be
exempted from taxation; but such exemptions shall be only by
general law.2 (Emphasis added.)
The Constitution grants to the legislature permissive power to make specific
exemptions. But the wording of the Constitution in effect restricts this per-
missive authority within classes already established by the document.
The legislature has by general law exempted charities from taxation
and in doing so has broadened the meaning of "charity." The legislature has
exempted:
All property of institutions of public charity, all property of benefi-
cient and charitable organizations, whether incorporated in this or
any other state of the United States, and all property of old people's
homes, when such property is actually and exclusively used for
such charitable or beneficient purposes, and not leased or other-
wise used with a view to profit; and all free public libraries.3
It is readily apparent that neither the Constitution nor legislative enact-
ment has provided a definition of "charity." Therefore, we must focus our
attention on the judicial handling of the matter. While many states have
rejected a common law definition of charity in preference to statutory defi-
. 1 Bennett, Robert T., Real Property Tax Exemption of Non-Profit Organizations, 16
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 165 (1967).
2 I1. Const. art. IX, § 3 (1870).
SIll. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 500.7 (1967).
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nition, Illinois has not. The English Statute of Charitable Uses4 is the
foundation for Illinois law and its definition. From that point on the defini-
tion has developed through case law. The definition most notably and gen-
erally used by the Illinois courts is that given by Justice Gray in Jackson v.
Phillips.5
A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefi-
nite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish them-
selves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is im-
material whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself,
if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature. 6
In hearing cases in which an organization's ability to qualify for exemp-
tion is at issue, the courts have always followed the policy of strictly constru-
ing the exemption provisions in favor of taxation and against exemption.7
In handling the exemption cases the courts have predominantly followed a
two point test. The property in question must be owned by a charitable
organization and must be used for a charitable purpose.8
The courts have been consistent on what they considered to be a
charitable organization.
We have heretofore followed earlier decisions which said that the
distinctive characteristics of a charitable organization are that it
has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders, earns no profits, and
pays no dividends, but derives its funds mainly from public and
private charity and holds them in trust for the objects and pur-
poses expressed in its charter.9
Most frequently, question has arisen regarding an organization making
a profit. For example, where a religious organization ran a bookstore and
derived a profit from it, the charitable status of the store was brought into
question.' 0 The court examined the purpose of running the bookstore.
If the purpose was to effect religious education by distributing religious
materials, and profits derived from these sales were used for the continuation
or enlargement of that purpose, the exemption would be granted."' But
4 43 Eliz., C. 4 (1601).
5 14 Allen 556, 96 Mass. 556 (1867).
6 Crerar v. Williams, 145 I11. 625, 643, 4 N.E. 467, 470 (1893); Skinner v. Northern
Trust Co., 288 Ill. 229, 232, 123 N.E. 289, 290 (1919).
7 Follett's Illinois Book & Supply Store, Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 600, 190 N.E.2d 324
(1963).
8 Rogers Park Post No. 108, American Legion v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 286, 134 N.E.2d
292 (1956); Milward v. Paschen, 16 Ill. 2d 302, 157 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
9 American College of Surgeons v. Korzen, 36 111. 2d 340, 348, 224 N.E.2d 7, 11 (1967).
10 The Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290
II. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919).
11 Id. at 113, 125 N.E. at 10.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
if the purpose of running the bookstore is not to effect religious educa-
tion, but simply to make a profit which might be used in another part of the
organization for charitable purposes, the court would not grant the exemp-
tion.12 The fine line rests in the determination of the purpose. Where profits
are the motivation, the exemption is not granted. But where charity is the
purpose and profits are incidental to it and used for fostering the primary
purpose the exemption is granted.'3
Another factor in determining if ownership of the land is by a charitable
organization is the manner in which the organization receives its funds.
While the courts favor gifts as a source of funds, they have been tolerant of
organizations receiving their funds from membership dues.14 Some charitable
organizations raise the necessary funds for their charitable purposes by
charging those able to pay for the services being rendered. By so doing the
organization is able to provide services to those unable to pay.15 In The
People v. Y.M.C.A., 16 the exemption of a YMCA hotel was challenged
because it was making a profit from its paying customers. The court felt
the profits were inconsequential and were not the goal of the organization,
but rather a means of gaining funds from those who were able to pay in
order that they could provide charity to those that were unable to pay.
Likewise, in Parks v. Northwestern Univ.,1 7 the exempt status of the univer-
sity was challenged because part of its funds were derived from tuition. The
court saw this as an entirely proper means of gaining funds in order to carry
out a charitable purpose. With the exception of the areas of profits and
source of funds, the courts have had little difficulty in determining if an
organization was charitable. The court is quick to deny charitable status
to an organization which has capital, capital stock, or shareholders.' s Justice
Cardozo's famous statement effectively touches this area.
What controls is not the receipt of income, but its purpose. In-
come added to the endowment helps to make it possible for the
work to go on. It is only when income may be applied to the profit
of the founders that business has a beginning and charity an end.
The line of division is the same whether the gift is to education or
to relief of the poor, the halt, and the blind. Charity ministers to the
mind as well as to the body.' 9
The fact that the institution holding the property is judged to be
charitable is insufficient to exempt if from real property taxation. The
12 Id. at 117, 125 N.E. at 11.
'3 The People v. Y.M.C.A., 365 IlI. 118, 6 N.E.2d 166 (1937).
14 Supra note 9.
15 The Sisters of St. Francis v. The Board of Review, 231 Ill. 317, 83 N.E. 272 (1907);
People ex rel. Cannon v. Southern Ill. Hospital, 404 Ill. 66, 88 N.E.2d 20 (1949).
16 Supra note 13.
17 218 111. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905).
18 American College of Surgeons v. Korzen, 36 Ill. 2d 340, 224 N.E.2d 7 (1967).
19 Butterworth v. Keeler, 219 N.Y. 446, 447, 114 N.E. 803, 804 (1916).
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property must actually be used in carrying out the institution's charitable
purposes. 20 Even though the land is owned by the charitable institution if
it is not used for charitable purposes or is sitting idle it will not be exempt.
The use of the land must be active and for charitable purpose.
Thus, in The People v. Catholic Bishop,21 the Bishop appealed a judg-
ment given the Lake County collector for delinquent taxes on 465 acres
owned by the Bishop. The Bishop on appeal was able to show that 385 acres
of the total was actually used for charitable purposes. But as to the other 80
acres he only could show an intent to use it for a charitable purpose (he
planned to construct a golf course for seminarians). The court granted ex-
emption for all but the 80 acres because they were actively used for a
charitable purpose. Since the 80 acres was not in active use for a charitable
purpose it was taxed.
The main issue surrounding the charitable use of property rests on the
question of whether the use is primary or secondary. In The School of
Domestic Arts and Science v. Carr,22 the court was faced with this problem
when a school which taught domestic arts, and qualified as a charitable
institution, sought an exemption from taxation for its property, part of
which was used as a restaurant. The meals which the students made in the
course of their studies were sold in the restaurant and a profit was derived.
The court granted the exemption, finding the purpose of running the
restaurant charitable, with the profits being incidental to it. In regards to
the primary versus secondary conflict, the court stated:
If the property is devoted primarily to the religious or charitable
purposes which exempt from taxation an incidental use for another
purpose will not destroy the exemption, but an incidental use for
religious or charitable purposes of property whose primary use is
for another purpose will not warrant exemption.
23
Thus, we have seen that for property to be exempt from real estate taxa-
tion it is necessary that it be owned by a charitable institution and that the
active use of the property be for a charitable purpose. Until very recently
both of these requirements were not very stringently tested in determining
qualification. The relationship between the charter of the organization,
which stated its purpose, and the facts of the property's use were not re-
quired to be fully compatible. The ability to show some charitable purpose
and some charitable use was all that was required. The Illinois Supreme
Court in a recent case has shown strong signs of applying a more stringent
standard to the present test.
20 Follett's Illinois Book & Supply Store, Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 600, 190 N.E.2d 324
(1963).
21 311 Ill. 11, 142 N.E. 520 (1924).
22 322 Ill. 562, 153 N.E. 669 (1926).
23 Id. at 568, 153 N.E. at 671.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen,24 the plaintiff, an Illinois
not-for-profit corporation, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Georgian Home, which it owned and operated in Evanston, was
exempt from taxation. The Master in Chancery found that the Home did
not qualify for exemption, and the trial court followed his recommendation.
Being a revenue matter, the case was appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
The Home was so administered that for one to become a resident he
had to file an application with the board. The board screened the applicants
to ascertain that they were in good mental, emotional and physical health.
Upon acceptance of the applicant, a contract was entered into requiring the
applicant to pay a founder's fee varying from $6,250 to $25,000 and a monthly
charge from $175 to $375, the exact sum depending upon the size and loca-
tion of the individual's apartment within the home. The parties then under-
went a sixty day trial period, during which either party could rescind the
contract.
The court took particular note of the organization's charter, which stated
its purpose of providing "proper accommodation and care for the sick and
homeless aged."25 Judging from the chartered purpose of the organization it
is apparent that it met the first part of the test, which is that of ownership
by a charitable organization.
The court then undertook a detailed examination of the facts of the
property's use and determined that the facts did not evidence a charitable
use. But rather than state that the test requiring a charitable organization's
ownership of the property and a charitable use was not fulfilled the court
went further. It made particular reference to the failure of the use to meet
the purpose as expressed in its charter. The relationship of the use, which
was disclosed by the facts of operation, was correlated to the purpose, as
evidenced by the charter. The court summed up its analysis of the prop-
erty's use with this statement:
It is undisputed that plaintiff's corporation structure and its ab-
stinence from profit making in a private sense are akin to that of a
charitable institution. However, the variance between its stated
chartered purpose of providing "proper accommodations and care
for the sick and homeless aged;" and the health requirements con-
tained in its bylaws that "applicants shall be in good mental, emo-
tional and physical health, and free of any communicable disease,"
militates strongly against the requirement that it hold property in
trust for the objects and purposes expressed in its charter.26 (Empha-
sis added.)
The fact that the court devoted a minor portion of its opinion to the
24 39 111. 2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537.
25 Id. at 152, 233 N.E.2d at 539.
26 Id. at 157-8, 233 N.E.2d at 542.
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traditional two part test and devoted the greater portion of its opinion to
testing the facts of use against the chartered purpose seemingly points to a
more stringent test. The new test, if indeed Methodist Old Peoples Home v.
Korzen expresses one, will be the requirement of the property's ownership
by a charitable institution and a charitable use factually compatible to the
institution's charter. This test will be much more stringent than the old.
It indicates the court's recognition of the revenue drain which is taking
place through pseudo-charitable exemption from the real property tax, the
drain which is widening the gap between the state government's revenue
and expenses and is heightening the state's financial crisis.
W. D. RoMOSER
